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Abstract 
 
Internal forced displacement, a phenomenon associated to internal conflict, poses important socio-
economic challenges for the receiving areas. One of the most relevant aspects is related to crime, 
since the reception of forced displaced persons might increase inequality and the heterogeneity of 
population. This paper studies the relationship between internal forced displacement and crime. 
We use a panel of Colombian municipalities for the period 2003-2016.  We include spatial patterns 
for the study of crime, allowing to capture the dynamics of this relationship across time and space.  
Our results provide evidence of a spatial correlation between crime and internal forced 
displacement.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Forced displacement is commonly associated to civil conflicts and high levels of criminal acts of 
illegal armed groups. This phenomenon has similar effects to other types of migration for receiving 
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areas, causing socio-economic alterations such as inequality, poverty, unemployment and crime. 
The theoretical and empirical approaches generally used for studying the effects of migrations can 
be applied to forced displacements.   
In Colombia, internal migration is mostly caused by forced displacement.  It is a consequence of 
the domestic conflict and of the beginning of a new era dominated by criminal networks (InSight 
Crime, 2018). It is mostly characterized by the flow of inhabitants from rural to urban areas. This 
calamity has affected around eight million people in five decades and has created a conspicuous 
amount of problems and difficulties in all aspects of reception places (Unidad para las Victimas, 
2018). Additionally, during the period of time analyzed crime rates have persisted -- and even 
increased-- in most municipalities, negatively affecting the welfare of the population (Roche-
villarreal, 2012).   
The main objective of this paper is to study the relationship between internal forced migration and 
crime.  For that purpose, we conduct a study of crime rates in Colombian municipalities for the 
period 2003-2016, introducing a spatial component for the analysis. Recent theoretical approaches 
recognize the significance of spatial analysis when studying this relationship. 
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we conduct a literature review of the most relevant 
theories and empirical studies exploring the relationship between crime and migrations. Section 3 
presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 introduces our empirical strategy for spatial panel 
data, section 5 our results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Forced displacement is a rapid and unexpected type of migration (Roche-villarreal, 2012), and it is 
mostly derived from the strategy of territorial control and attacks to civilian population by armed 
illegal and criminal groups. Their territorial supremacy lead to the appropriation of important 
resources by insurgents and criminals, causing the loss of welfare and properties for the affected 
civilian population. Hence, the increased risk of suffering permanent injuries and the loss of lives 
for the inhabitants of the conflict areas are the most important determinants of forced displacement 
(Ibáñez, 2009). Host areas of forced migrants face different socioeconomic problems, such as the 
worsening of labor market conditions, the increase in inequality and worse living conditions (less 
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access to public services and to the educational system). Internal forced displacement also implies 
a change in the dynamics of the local population in receiving areas, as well as a larger heterogeneity 
of population; these are similar consequences to the ones of general migration.  
Theoretical approaches trying to explain the crime-migration relationship have their foundation in 
sociological and criminological theory. Three of the main theories are the Social Disorganization 
Theory, the Cultural Theory and the Strain Theory. The Social Disorganization Theory places 
special emphasis on the lack of resources, inhabitants’ diversity and residential mobility, stating 
that these are determinants of criminal acts. As a consequence of these factors, communities are 
unable to build strong relations, increasing social disorganization, which finally leads to higher 
crime rates (Mears, 2001). Cultural Theory proposes that the causes of crime are related to cultural 
contradictions, since immigrants face different behavior patterns in host areas, these contradictions 
promote tensions among the population. Strain Theory proposes that crime is derived from tensions 
generated by the pressures to succeed and structural barriers in the receiving areas. Therefore, 
tensions are generated between immigrants and the local population, since each group tries to 
quickly improve its living conditions (Thomas, 2011). These theories have a particularly 
characteristic in common, one the main determinants of the crime is the population heterogeneity, 
due to the differences between migrants and local inhabitants. 
The seminal work of Becker (1968) addresses the rationality behind crime: the process of utility 
maximization of criminals is derived from the evaluation of the cost, benefit and punishment of 
committing a crime. Ehrlich (1973) explains the relationship between criminal activities and 
aspects like income, physical elements and other variables.   
Migration and its effects on well-being, economic growth, labor market, and security has been 
widely studied in the literature. Migration can be internal or external. The latter is a phenomenon 
that occurs more frequently in developed countries, where migration is mostly motivated by 
economic reasons. On the other hand, internal migration is a local phenomenon that can be 
explained by different aspects. It can be explained by public order problems in specific regions of 
the country, and by economic motivations such as labor opportunities, better education offer, or 
higher wages, among others. These two types of migration imply two different scenarios for the 
analysis of crime. With regard to international migration, the opportunity cost when committing a 
crime is much higher, since --depending on the severity-- deportation is very likely. Contrarily, if 
migration is internal, there are less obstacles to see crime as a viable option for income generation.  
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Chiswick & Miller (2014) state that if crime can be observed and analyzed as an economic factor, 
then it is clear how migration comes into play. One of the first determinants of internal migration 
that has been studied is related to the returns between rural and industrial activities. When rural 
fertility exceeds urban fertility, the agricultural labor force will grow faster than industrial 
employment (Herrick, 1965). In principle, this was viewed as beneficial due to the scarce labor 
supply in the large industrial centers. But today, the migration is being increasingly viewed as the 
major contributing factor to the phenomenon of urban surplus labor and as a force that continues 
to exacerbate serious urban unemployment problems, caused by growing economic and structural 
imbalances between urban and rural areas (Herrick, 1965).1 As for crime and its economic effects, 
its increase is negatively related to the welfare of citizens – by the reduction in security perception-
, its influence on investment decisions, and the lower public investment in sectors that would 
generate higher welfare effects, since resources are diverted to investment for the prevention of 
crime.  
In some specific cases, migration could be related to crime. When low-skilled people arrive to areas 
in which job opportunities are scarce, and in most cases, with few contact networks, this reduces 
the chance of getting a job and increases the possibility of enrolling in illegal activities.  An 
important factor that increases the participation in illegal activities is the fact that these activities 
generate high income with little effort.2  The government’s effort to punish crime is a key factor 
for its reduction, as stated by Ehrlich (1973).  
Despite of the general belief claiming that there is a link between migration and crime, empirical 
research exploring this relationship is sparse (Reid, Weiss, Adelman, & Jaret, 2005). Reid et al. 
(2005) examine the effects of migration on crime rates in metropolitan areas. After controlling for 
a host of demographic and economic characteristics, they find that migration does not increase 
crime rates in the receiving areas, and even some aspects of migration lessen crime in metropolitan 
areas. A similar  approach is the one of Bianchi, Buonanno, & Pinotti (2012), who find that 
migration only increases the incidence of robberies, while leaving unaﬀected all other types of 
crime. One important aspect of these studies is that migration is international, i.e., the opportunity 
cost of committing a crime is higher for immigrants, as mentioned above. Similarly, Kubrin, Hipp, 
& Kim (2016) find a decrease of violent crimes in neighborhoods located in the southern part of 
                                                          
1 In this perspective, for the Colombian case Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez (2016), find that internal migration 
substantially reduces wages for urban unskilled workers who compete for jobs with forced migrants. 
2   Psychological and social factors are also important determinants of criminal behavior (see Hirschi; 1969). 
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California where more immigrants from Northern Africa arrive, but in areas with higher rates of 
Central American immigrants more violent crimes are committed. In neighborhoods with more 
East Asian immigrants, lower property crimes were committed.  
In the literature, different studies analyze both the positive and negative effects of the relationship 
between migration and crime. Bell, Fasani, & Machin (2013) find that the reception of a greater 
number of migrants increases crime rates.  They provide evidence of higher crime rates in areas of 
Wales where asylum seekers are located. Nunziata (2015) presents a low positive correlation for 
three specifications for the relationship migration-crime in European countries. On the same line 
of argumentation, Spenkush (2011) finds –for the U.S. case--  that an increase of 10% in the share 
of migrant population rises the property crime rate by 1.2% , but without any effect on violent 
crime rates.  Wadsworth (2010) states that there was a reduction in homicide and robbery in the 
U.S. between 1990 and 2000, partially due to the increase in immigration. This is similar to the 
findings of Ousey & Kubrin (2009) for 159 large U.S. cities in the period 1980-2000.   
Internal migrations share some commonalities with international migrations, such as the motivation 
of migrants to achieve better economic conditions and to escape of violence. This type of migration, 
though, can also be the result of governmental policies. Should that be the case, a population change 
will take place and it will interfere with the community’s capacity of inhibiting crimes. It will 
increase the heterogeneity of the population and promote socio-economic disadvantages (Treyger, 
2013).  
 One of the main characteristics of internal migration is that, to a large degree, it corresponds to a 
movement from  rural population to urban areas (Meng & Zhang, 2013). Similarly to the studies 
conducted for the relationship between international migration and crime, findings for the 
relationship between internal migrations and crime are ambiguous. For the Canadian case, 
Andresen (2013) affirms that there is a lack of evidence of the effect of local migration on crime 
rates. This goes in line with the findings of Meng & Zhang (2013) for rural to urban domestic 
migrations in China. On the contrary, Treyger (2013) presents an increase of crime rates caused by 
government relocation of domestic migrants. Schultz (1971) finds that before the internal conflict, 
interregional migration in Colombia responded to market forces drawing rural labor to the cities 
from regions where the returns to labor were relatively low and the supply of labor was growing 
relatively rapidly. 
6 
 
Traditional approaches explain the variation of crime rates based on economic and demographic 
conditions, but criminal activities present spatial and temporal concentrations. Hence, the analysis 
of patterns and causes of crime rates requires using an approach that allows the inclusion of the 
spatial dynamics of the variables (Almeida, Haddad, & Hewings, 2003). The main theoretical 
perspectives are related to the Routine Activities and Crime Hot Spots approaches. The Routine 
Activities approach proposes that the place determines favorable or unfavorable conditions for 
crime acts through two forms: first, physical features influence the social control capacities of 
crime suppressors. Second, criminal actions are not randomly distributed in space, crime is 
influenced by routine activities that occur and by characteristics of each place, that means the 
criminal actions have spatial concentration in areas with characteristic conducive to crime.  The 
Crime Hot Spots approach associates the population conditions and some land uses with the spatial 
concentration of the crime. Furthermore, physical conditions can show signs of the social control 
that the community can exercise in the area (Anselin, Cohen, Cook, Gorr, & Tita, 2000). 
Consequently, some studies consider the inclusion of spatial effects to explain the relationship 
between migration and crime. Arnio & Baumer (2012) provide evidence in favor of the presence 
of spatial heterogeneity effects in Chicago's neighborhoods between 2007-2009, but the 
concentration of immigrants does not have significant effects on crime. Similarly, Graif & 
Sampson (2009) suggest the same effect of spatial patterns and migrants for homicide rates across 
neighborhoods of Chicago between 1990-2000. Using a spatial panel data model for the migration-
crime relationship between 2001 and 2011 for Wales and England, Jaitman & Machin (2013) find 
evidence supporting this linkage. Additionally, Cracolici & Uberti (2009) suggest that the 
importance of the inclusion of spatial effects for the analysis of crime rates in the Italian provinces 
and the concentration of foreigners in the previous periods are an important determinants of 
criminal activities for this region. 
As a consequence of the decades-long clash between government forces and antigovernment 
insurgent groups, internal forced displacement has been the main cause of internal migrations in 
Colombia. The intensification of the armed internal conflict and the intention of illegal armed 
groups to expand territory control and asset appropriation, in conjunction with the country’s  
institutional weakness, has induced the mobility of the population to safer areas in other 
municipalities (Ibáñez, 2009). Important studies about the effects of displacement on poverty, 
inequality, and the labor market have been conducted. Ibáñez & Vélez (2008) find that welfare 
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losses caused by forced displacement in Colombia represent 37% of the net present value of rural 
lifetime aggregate consumption. They affirm that a violent environment modifies the net benefits 
of migration.3 Additionally, forced displaced persons confront a decrease in labor income, severe 
conditions in host areas, and severe disruption of risk-sharing mechanisms. The effects of 
government programs are transitory, and forced migrants are unable to recover the levels of income 
and welfare that they had before displacement (Ibáñez & Moya, 2010). 
Using a structural model of crime and inequality, Bourguignon, Nunez & Sanchez (2017) show 
that income distribution in Colombia influences aggregate crime and find that many criminals live 
in households with an income per capita eighty percent below the mean. Furthermore, inflows of 
forced migrants increase the proportion of low-skilled and informal workers, causing a reduction 
of informal wages (Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez, 2016). Consequently, the welfare loss of forced 
displaced people can determine the incurrence in illegal actions of this population and generate 
labor market problems. Informal wage reduction and an unequal distribution of income influences 
the criminal propensity of the entire population. 
While internal forced displacement and its effects has been widely studied, its repercussion in terms 
of crime in receiving areas has not been thoroughly studied and evidence is little and not conclusive. 
One of the previous works is the one of Roche-Villarreal (2012), who studies the effect of 
displacement on crime against property for municipalities, but his results do not reflect a 
relationship (Reid et al.,2005). For the specific case that motivates this study, the Colombian 
conflict, it persisted for over 50 years and led to 7’849.014 cases of displacement, according to the 
Unidad para las Victimas.  
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
 
Becker (1968) defines criminals as rational agents, being their actions a result of a maximization 
process that considers costs and punishment of illegal acts.  He also presents the number of crimes 
of an individual as a function of the probability of conviction, the punishment, and a combined 
variable that captures other influences.  Ehrlich (1973) expands this model and presents an 
                                                          
3 Other studies by Ana Maria Ibañez have been important for the analysis of crime – see Ibáñez, Rodríguez and Zarruk, 
2013-, violence and internal migration in Colombia – see Ibáñez and Moya, 2010, Engels and Ibáñez, 2007, Fernandez, 
Ibáñez and Peña (2014); and labor market effects of migration by internal refugees - Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez, 2016.  
8 
 
individual crime behavioral function, assuming the number of criminal actions are monotonically 
related with the probability of arrest (𝑝), marginal cost of the punishment (𝑓), the marginal earning 
of the illegal (𝑤𝑐) and legal (𝑤𝑙) activities, probability of be unemployment (𝑢) and group of 
variables (𝜋) that may affect the frequency of crimes. 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝜓(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑤𝑐, 𝑤𝑙, 𝑢, 𝜋)    (1.1) 
This approach assumes that all individuals are identical, quality that permits to aggregate the 
individual functions. Therefore, the number of crimes in the society are defined as an aggregate 
behavioral function. 
𝑄 = Ψ(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝑌𝑐, 𝑌𝑙, 𝑈, Π)    (1.2) 
Where the variables denote the mean of the components of the individual behavioral function. 
Additionally, Ehrlich (1973) proposes some behavioral implications for this model:  The increase 
in the probability of arrest and the marginal cost of punishment reduce the incentives of 
participating in illegal activities. Similarly, an increase in the probability of being unemployed and 
an increase in the earnings derived from illegal activities generate a rise in incentives for 
committing a crime. 
Extensions of the Becker-Ehrlich model allow to include socio-economic, geographic and 
demographic variables (Cracolici & Uberti, 2009). This theoretical framework is usually used for 
the analysis of the relationship between all types of migration and crime. For our study, this model 
allows to consider the reception of forced displaced persons and to take into account the spatial 
allocation of the variables.  
The internal flow of forced displaced persons has indirect effects on crime rates in the receiving 
areas. Three principal factors of utmost importance for determining the size and scope of the effect 
are the probability of apprehension, the severity of punishment and the demographic factors. The 
first two aspects are related to the government’s ability (or inability) to maintain the levels of 
security. Meanwhile, the change in demographic characteristics is a consequence of the variation 
of the share of young population, average levels of education, the unemployment rate, poverty 
levels and others socio-economic variables (Roche-villarreal, 2012). 
The inclusion of spatial patterns in the analysis of criminal actions is related to the distribution of 
socio-economic variables across space and the interdependence of geographical areas (Light & 
Harris, 2012).  Specifically, the spatial distribution of crime is determined by the location of the 
criminals and victims, environmental conditions, and population characteristics. Hence, the 
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geographic concentration of crime is associated with hot spots with particular conditions (Anselin 
et al., 2000). These patterns require the addition of spatial effects when analyzing crime. The 
inclusion of spatial effects in econometric modeling is accomplished considering the spatial weight 
matrix interaction with the variables of the model. The spatial weight matrix describes the spatial 
allocation of the units of analysis and their spatial relationship (Tita & Radil, 2010). 
Consequently with the approaches of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), this paper presents a 
supply offences function, where each kind of crime depended of the reception of the forced 
displaced persons and determinants of the heterogeneity. 
(
𝑄
𝑁
)
𝑖
= A𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑊𝑒
(𝜇𝑖+𝜏𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡)     (1.3) 
In the equation (1.3), the component  (
𝑄
𝑁
)
𝑖
 represent the number of specific crimes in area 𝑖, where  
𝑁 is a population scale factor, 𝐴 is a constant, 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑖 is the number of reception of forced displaced 
persons in region 𝑖, 𝑋𝑖 is a portmanteau of heterogeneity variables of population in 𝑖 and the 
probability of apprehension for the same type of crime in the area, W are the spatial effects and 𝑢𝑖 
summarize the effects of the physic, income and other nonquantifiable variables in the same area. 
From the linearization of the equation (1.3) is obtainable the econometric specification for the panel 
model: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1.4) 
Where  𝑖 denotes municipalities and 𝑡 denotes time. 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the crime rate per 100.000 inhabitants of 
the region 𝑖 and year 𝑡, 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the reception forced displaced persons rate per 100.000 inhabitants, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a portmanteau of heterogeneity variables the probability of apprehension for the same type 
of crime in the area,, 𝜇𝑖 are municipality fixed effects, 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 the error 
term. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
 
The most common empirical strategy when addressing the relationship between crime and 
migration is the panel data approach. However, this empirical strategy assumes spatial invariance 
and therefore, leads to inconsistent results (Graif & Sampson 2009). Other theoretical standpoints 
recognize the non-stationary and spatial process of crime, integrating the spatial components in the 
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models (Cahill & Mulligan, 2007).  It is therefore possible to integrate the spatial components to 
the theoretical model presented in the previous section and to conduct the estimation of a spatial 
panel. Hence, the identification of the ideal spatial model specification is an important phase in the 
incorporation of the spatial effects in the model.  
We use four data sources. Crime categories for the municipalities come from the Colombian 
National Police yearly reports. Internal forced displacement statistics are produced by the Unidad 
para las Victimas. Demographic data is produced by the National Department of Statistics 
(DANE). We also use data from the Municipal Panel of the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo 
Económico (CEDE), at the Universidad de los Andes.  
Table 1 presents information about central variables included in the analysis and the number of 
occurrence according to each crime category. Our study considers five types of crime: homicides, 
kidnapping, personal injuries, automobile theft and residence burglary. We selected these crime 
categories because they are reported and registered with more frequently. The main explanatory 
variables is the number of reception forced displacement population in each municipality. 
Additionally, this research considers significant predictors of crime and determinants of population 
heterogeneity for use in control variables. 
 
Table 1. Description of variables included in the analysis of forced displacement-crime 
relation and data source 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variables 
Homicide rates  
Logarithm of the number of homicides per 100.000 inhabitants in each 
municipality 
Policia Nacional 
Colombia 
Kidnapping rate 
Logarithm of the number of kidnapping per 100.000 inhabitants in each 
municipality 
Policia Nacional 
Colombia 
Personal injuries rate 
Logarithm of the number of personal injuries per 100.000 inhabitants in each 
municipality 
Policia Nacional 
Colombia 
Residence burglary rate 
Logarithm of the number of residence burglary per 100.000 inhabitants in each 
municipality 
Policia Nacional 
Colombia 
Automobile theft rate 
Logarithm of the number of automobile theft per 100.000 inhabitants in each 
municipality 
Policia Nacional 
Colombia 
Reception FDP rate 
Logarithm of the number of reception of forced displaced persons per 100.000 
inhabitants in each municipality 
Unidad para las 
Victimas 
Percentage Male 19-34 Percentage of male population between 15-34 years for each municipality DANE 
Log Population Logarithm of the total population for each municipality Panel CEDE 
Probability of 
apprehension 
Ratio of the number of arrest for each kind of crime per crime know in each crime 
category and municipality 
Policia Nacional 
Colombia 
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We choose our control variables based on previous empirical studies on crime and considering the 
data availability for Colombian municipalities. Other researches considers a population density an 
important determinant of criminal acts because with larger population in area provides more 
opportunities for offending and less social controls for criminals (Reid, Weiss, Adelman & Jaret, 
2005). Furthermore, the males are more prone to commit criminal acts (Cheng, Liu & Wang, 2017). 
The empirical strategy includes proportion of males in total inhabitants to control for these effects. 
Additionally, the econometric model includes apprehension rate for each kind of crime, because 
with the higher probability of be arrest reduce individual incentives for commit a crime (Ehrlich, 
1973). Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum  
      
Homicide rate 15,344 36.08786 60.36675 0 1607.467 
Kidnapping rate 15,344 2.048034 8.874547 0 255.4278 
Personal injuries rate 15,344 98.94865 132.3395 0 4723.072 
Residence burglary rate 15,344 23.03598 44.96272 0 1087.326 
Automobile theft  15,344 5.406671 17.69463 0 886.1439       
Reception of forced displaced persons 
rate  
15,344 704.9444 1849.586 0 70958.08 
Total population 15,344 41197.11 251271.3 837 7980001 
Percentage of male 15-34 15,344 32.49694 2.946209 20.74386 68.43639       
Probability of capture for homicide 15,344 43.01665 92.91093 0 2900 
Probability of capture for kidnapping  15,344 353.6303 2452.473 0 118200 
Probability of capture for personal 
injuries 
15,344 7.971155 51.9168 0 2300 
Probability of capture for residence 
burglary  
15,344 18.898 82.43693 0 3100 
Probability of capture for 
Automobile theft  
15,344 9.572107 50.00202 0 1200 
 
 The criminal and reception of forced displaced persons rates are obtained of by multiplying each crime variable 
by a factor of 100,000/total population municipality, the probability of apprehension for each kind of crime is 
determined by the division of the number of captures above the number of crimes committed in the same category. 
 
 The descriptive statistics in table 2, correspond to the information of the variables in levels. 
Before estimating the dynamic of spatial patterns, the Explanatory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) 
is a descriptive step for identifying the presence of spatial effects in the area of analysis (Ye & Wu, 
2011). In Colombia, the presence of criminal gangs, drug cartels and illegal armed groups across 
geographical areas is an important determinant of crime. The change in dynamics of these criminal 
congregations and of governmental actions generate lead to a change in crime rates over time and 
space. Therefore, our study provides an ESDA of the five categories of crime rates, but –because 
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of space limitations—we only show the analysis for the first, seventh and thirteenth years of the 
period of time analyzed (2003, 2009 and 2016). This procedure consists of taking a sample of the 
selected period to see if there are changes in the spatial dynamics of the variables and to verify the 
inclusion of these effects in the empirical model. 
Figure 1 depicts the spatial dynamics of the five categories of crime: homicides, kidnapping, 
personal injuries, automobile theft and burglary residences. Specifically, municipalities with high 
homicide rates are concentrated in the following departments:4 Andean region, Cesar and Guajira 
(Caribbean region), Valle del Cauca and Choco (Pacific region), Arauca, Meta and Casanare 
(Orinoquia region), Putumayo and Caqueta (Amazonas region). For the 6th and 13th years, the 
spatial dynamics change since the number of municipalities with homicide rates above of the mean 
decrease, particularly in the Pacific region. Kidnapping rates show a similar spatial distribution, 
but with smaller number of municipalities above the mean than homicide rates. As in the case of 
homicides, kidnapping rates show a significant reduction in the years 2009 and 2016. For this 
category, the largest number of municipalities with high rates are located in Arauca, Casanare and 
Norte de Santander (North-East) and Nariño, Putumayo and Cauca (South-West).  
Personal injuries rates show a similar distribution in 2003 and the municipalities with higher rates 
are located in the east, central and western part of Colombia. As for year 2009, an increase in the 
number of municipalities with high rates can be observed, especially in the eastern and northern 
area. In 2016, municipalities with rates above of the mean are concentrated in the Andean region, 
the north-east and the south-west area. Residences burglary rates show a similar geographic 
allocation for the three years of analysis, this rate increases each period and presents more 
municipalities with higher rates in 2016, particularly in the Orinoquia and Andean regions. 
Automobile theft rates present a constant spatial distribution of the municipalities with the highest 
figures; these municipalities are located in the center, north-east and south-west areas. Reception 
rates of forced displaced persons in 2003 are concentrated in bordering areas of the Colombian 
territory, especially in Choco, Antioquia, Putumayo, Valle del Cauca, Guajira, Cesar and 
Magdalena. The number of municipalities with forced displaced persons rates below the mean 
increase in 2009 and in greater proportion in 2016. For the last year, municipalities with higher 
rates are located in the Pacific Coast. 
                                                          
4 The departments are political units equivalents to states or provinces  
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Figure 1. Standard Deviation maps 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and Unidad para las Victima
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Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and Unidad para las Victimas
15 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and Unidad para las Victimas
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Considering the capacity of the criminal actions for concentration of spatial effects, it is necessary 
to identify the relationships determined by geographic proximity. Local Indicators of Spatial 
Association (LISA) maps allow to detect the existence of spatial clusters and the influence of 
spatial global autocorrelation (Cracolici & Uberti, 2009). Figure 2 includes the LISA maps for the 
five crime categories and the rates of reception of displaced persons. These maps show important 
changes from 2003 to 2016, since important differences can be identified for the five crime 
categories. In some cases, a reduction of cluster is present. In other cases, growth and 
overdispersion is present, but all LISA maps have spatial clusters in the center and north-west area. 
High rates municipality neighborhoods are depicted in red and low rates municipality 
neighborhoods are depicted in blue. The considerable presence of these clusters contribute 
significantly to a positive spatial autocorrelation. 
Additionally, the Moran’s I for the cross-section regressions for each year and for each kind of rate 
describes the presence of spatial autocorrelation; Table 3 presents the tests for the years 2003, 2009 
and 2016 for each kind of log crime rate in the basic regression with log reception of forced 
displaced persons rate. The construction of LISA maps, Moran’s I tests and posterior spatial 
regressions, use a spatial weight matrix of queen contiguity first order and normalized. 
 
Table 3. Moran’s I Test for regressions between log crime rate and log reception forced 
displaced persons rate 
Moran test for spatial dependence 
    2003 2009 2016 
variable           Test    
 Homicide Rates  
  
𝜒2  99.44 64.08 30.58 
         Prob. > 𝜒2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Kidnapping Rate 
  
𝜒2 21.87 11.36 2.4 
         Prob. > 𝜒2  0.000 0.000 0.121 
       
Personal Injuries Rate 
  
𝜒2 61.95 97.11 80.07 
         Prob. > 𝜒2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Residence Burglary Rate 
  
𝜒2 221.32 194.79 62.24 
         Prob. > 𝜒2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Automobile Theft Rate 
  
𝜒2 132.39 139.14 226.14 
         Prob. > 𝜒2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Figure 2. LISA maps 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and Unidad para las Victimas
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Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and Unidad para las Victimas
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Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and Unidad para las Victimas
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Spatial panel models offers technically advantages over traditional approach, such as a less 
collinearity, increase degrees of freedom and permits to incorporate numerous effects. The 
procedure for proper identification model consists first in identify the adequate model 
without spatial effects and choose between the models Pooled, Fixed Effects Panel and 
Random Effects Panel. The second phase consists in estimating the general model of spatial 
Durbin model (SDM) and test if is more appropriate than spatial lag model (SAR), spatial 
error model (SEM), spatial lag of X (SLX), spatial Durbin error model (SDEM), general 
nesting spatial model (GNS) or spatial autocorrelation model (SAC) (Torres-Preciado, 
Polanco-Gaytán, & Tinoco-Zermeño, 2017).  
 
The equation (1.4) represents a traditional model without spatial interaction, such as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (2.1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent and explanatories variables respectively, 𝜇𝑖 is the 
unobserved effects between units in the sample and  𝜖𝑖𝑡 the traditional error term. The matrix 
of spatial weights (𝑊) describes the spatial arrangement of the geographic areas and their 
neighborhood links. This matrix defines the intensity of spatial effects and its interaction with 
terms of traditional model describes the kind of spatial econometric model and for 𝑁 units of 
analysis the spatial. Weights spatial matrix is an 𝑁𝑥𝑁 matrix, where all elements in the 
diagonal are equal to zero and the other elements in the matrix represent the spatial contiguity 
between the areas (Cracolici & Uberti, 2009). Usually, the spatial weighs matrix is a binary 
matrix and their elements characterize if a spatial unity is contiguous to other, when the 
elements are neighbors the elements takes a value of one. Alternatively, the normalization of 
this matrix is also used. Additionally, the usual spatial contiguity used for create the spatial 
weights matrix can be Rook when units shares a common vertex and Queen when have a 
vertex or point in common (Fischer & Getis, 2010).  
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V. Results 
 
In line with the procedure suggested by Elhorst (2014),  this paper initially provides the 
estimation for pooled, fixed effect and random effect panel models for each kind of crime 
categories. Table 4 presents the results for each type of crime and the significance of the 
coefficients of the pooled regressions. Table 5 provides information of the fixed effects panel 
regression and Table 6 for the random effects panel. 
 
Table 4. Pooled estimations 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries 
rate model 
Burglary 
residences model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .26382617*** .08912482*** -.03694894*** -0.01608378 -.01268782* 
Population 1.2929056*** .71507213*** .94017414*** 2.1134704*** 2.0668262*** 
Percentage Male 
19-34 
-.03089431** -.08942313*** -.06225877*** -.18865872*** -.08176896*** 
Probability of 
apprehension 
.00725166*** .000309*** .00044811*** .00718324*** .01816854*** 
Constant -12.065457*** -11.699514*** -4.1126869*** -16.040054*** -22.643217*** 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
Table 5. Fixed effect estimations 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries 
rate model 
Burglary 
residences model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .04603446*** .02752444*** -.05464209*** -0.01313828 0.00004585 
Population 2.3354171*** -3.9790224*** -0.0516808 2.6455422*** 0.41587503 
Percentage Male 
19-34 
-.30095992*** -.61058417*** .32854318*** .14347018*** -.08167562** 
Probability of 
apprehension 
.00920971*** .00030803*** .00131163*** .00639889*** .01292281*** 
Constant -12.520778** 50.437407*** -7.2600823 -31.934865*** -6.831111 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Table 6. Random effect estimations 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries 
rate model 
Burglary 
residences model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .12578669*** .07547447*** -.05756337*** -.02345688** -0.00168746 
Population 1.5803721*** .78722408*** .88545233*** 2.0553716*** 2.0644318*** 
Percentage Male 
19-34 
-.08995007*** -.18240844*** .04878316** -.07868178*** -.0912083*** 
Probability of 
apprehension 
.0087392*** .00031141*** .00083336** .00632693*** .01386742*** 
Constant -12.432416*** -9.3171962*** -7.1249612*** -19.022246*** -22.314712*** 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
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For each type of regressions, the basic model suggests a significant and positive relationship 
between crime rates and internal forced displacement. Nevertheless, this does not hold for 
residence burglary and automobile theft rates, where the log of forced displaced persons is 
not significant for the estimation with controls. Our data includes information for 1096 
Colombian municipalities (out of 1122 municipalities); this argument and statistic test 
(Hausmman and Breusch-Pagan tests, see annex 1) support the fixed effect panel 
specification. The results of fixed effects models are consistent with the ones of Roche-
Villarreal (2012) and present the counterintuitive sign in the coefficients of probability of 
apprehension and percentage of males between 19-34 years. The probability of apprehension 
is related to the number of criminals: cities with high crime rates have more criminals and 
more arrests, but this variable does not represent a deterrence to crime. On the other hand, 
the negative sign in the percentage of males between 19-34 years is possibly a sign of the 
change of the criminal population, since age and sex are not a determinant for all types of 
crime. 
In our work, the interactions of the spatial effects are introduced with a spatial weight matrix 
of queen contiguity normalized and provides the estimation of the seven spatial specifications 
(SAR, SEM, SLX, SAC, SDM, SDEM, and SGN) for each category of crime. Table 7 shows 
the results of the spatial general nested model specification.  Since it is the most appropriate 
model, it allows to incorporate the spatial determinants of the allocation of crime, of forced 
displaced person and heterogeneity population variables and includes in the spatial error 
term, that contains the omitted spatial variables correlated with crime. Additionally, the 
selection criteria AIC statistic in SGN models present the lowest values, confirming the 
empirical relevance of using this spatial model (see annex 2 for SAR, SEM, SLX, SAC, 
SDM, SDEM). Additionally, Table 8 presents the decomposition of the direct, indirect and 
total effects of the SGN for the models. The equations (2.3) and (2.4) presents SGN model 
specification. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑍𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (2.2) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑊𝑢𝑖𝑡  + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2.3) 
Where 𝑖 denotes municipalities, 𝑗 the contiguous municipalities and 𝑡 denotes time. 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the 
crime rate per 100.000 inhabitants of the region 𝑖 and year 𝑡, 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the reception forced 
displaced persons rate per 100.000 inhabitants, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of population, percentage 
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of male between 19-34 years and probability of apprehension, 𝑍𝑗𝑡 denotes the explanatories 
variables in the neighbor municipalities, 𝜇𝑖 are municipality fixed effects, 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed 
effects,  𝜀𝑖𝑡 the error term and 𝑢𝑗𝑡 the spatial error term. 
 
Table 7. SGN model estimations 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries 
rate model 
Burglary 
residences model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate 0.01316678 -0.00652809 -0.00967941 .02505036** -0.00315888 
Population 0.77446797 1.4951581** -1.8679576*** -1.9136101** -1.4537463* 
Percentage Male 19-34 -.14188303*** .08094279* -0.05387527 -.1579991*** 0.00008322 
Probability of apprehension .00972359*** .00029993*** .0028585*** .00674314*** .0131025*** 
        
Spatial           
Reception FDP rate .08727466*** .02888089** -.04871129*** -.05669624*** 0.00448081 
Dependent variable .48737893*** .63903087*** .70511169*** .74154561*** .54749953*** 
Spatial error term  -.41721956*** -.6138512*** -.61182389*** -.66365103*** 
-
.44647918*** 
Population 2.0101036** -4.0259587*** 1.8067429** 3.5617325*** 3.1065565*** 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.03477145 -.41431576*** .16682703*** .18749747*** -.10394889* 
Probability of apprehension -.00695238*** -.00016795*** -.0036189*** -.00670266*** -.0092068*** 
        
Constant 3.7939097*** 3.3064173*** 3.2508369*** 4.3100933*** 3.7598023*** 
        
Statistics           
AIC 79508.28 76617.582 76473.867 84879.098 79507.565 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
The results of the spatial estimations confirm the relevance of spatial effects for the analysis 
of crime. Most of the coefficients associated to the variables’ spatial effects are significant. 
Additionally, the spatial effects of forced displaced persons show a positive sign for the 
homicide and kidnapping rates and a negative sign for personal injuries and residence 
burglary.  This explains that forced displaced persons, in some cases, increase the social 
control for some type of crimes, but increase the occurrence of others.  
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 8. Direct, indirect and total effects 
 
  
Homicide 
estimation 
Kidnapping 
estimation 
Personal Injuries 
estimation 
Burglary of 
residence 
estimation 
Automobile 
theft 
estimation 
        
Direct        
Reception FDP rate 0.0232179** -0.0024263 -0.0208834** 0.0164385 -0.0028074 
  (0.0098753) (0.0089129) (0.0088959) (0.0119479) (0.0098511) 
Population 1.030601 0.9854459 -1.76918*** -1.429546* -1.158563 
  (0.7120705) (0.6396915) (0.6300803) (0.8455048) (0.7083523) 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.1530316*** 0.0207518 -0.0278831 -0.1421098** -0.0131904 
  (0.04839) (0.0433241) (0.0426396) (0.0570445) (0.0480333) 
Probability of apprehension 0.0094861*** 0.0003039*** 0.002535*** 0.0063586*** 0.0128428*** 
  (0.0004048) (0.0000149) (0.0004047) (0.0008217) (0.0007222) 
Indirect       
Reception FDP rate 0.1722189*** 0.0641633** -0.1766107*** -0.1384776** 0.0057122 
  (0.0285913) (0.0317525) (0.0378982) (0.0559216) (0.0312113) 
Population 4.388677*** -7.97329*** 1.557049 7.783693*** 4.797201*** 
  (1.36657) (1.462422) (1.696799) (2.491263) (1.471915) 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.1910237** -0.941552*** 0.4097195*** 0.2554987* -0.2157182** 
  (0.0808632) (0.0849689) (0.1002854) (0.1421476) (0.0863166) 
Probability of apprehension -0.0040684*** 0.0000616 -0.0050988*** -0.0061839 -0.0042212 
  (0.0012947) (0.0000544) (0.0014893) (0.0044471) (0.0027006) 
Total       
Reception FDP rate 0.1954367*** 0.061737* -0.197494*** -0.1220391** 0.0029047 
  (0.0296083) (0.0329369) (0.0396816) (0.0585122) (0.0326105) 
Population 5.419278*** -6.987844*** -0.212131 6.354147** 3.638638*** 
  (1.226427) (1.357032) (1.635095) (2.425591) (1.35593) 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.3440553*** -0.9208003*** 0.3818364*** 0.1133889 -0.2289086*** 
  (0.0683214) (0.0756657) (0.0943737) (0.1348704) (0.0756634) 
Probability of apprehension 0.0054178*** 0.0003654*** -0.0025637* 0.0001746 0.0086216*** 
  (0.00136) (0.0000585) (0.001509) (0.0046551) (0.0029184) 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
The essential result of our estimations is that each category of crime has different 
determinants and dynamics, this confirms the differences in the spatial distribution of crime 
and of the reception of forced displaced persons across the Colombian territory. Due to these 
differences, it is inappropriate to consolidate a composite crime index. Consequently, the 
spatial allocation of the population heterogeneity variables are relevant for the explanation 
of crime levels, which shows that previous estimates present bias error, since they do not 
consider the spatial patterns of the variables.  
The estimation results for homicide, kidnapping, personal injuries and residence burglary 
rates suggest a significant relationship with the allocation of forced displaced persons in 
nearest areas. This means that in the case of homicide rates, it is possible to identify a positive 
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effect of the reception of forced displaced persons in nearby areas with an increase in the 
local homicides, this is similar to the findings for kidnapping rates. These patterns suggest a 
mobility of criminals to nearby places for committing these types of crimes. The effect of the 
reception of forced displaced persons on the personal injuries rate presents a contrary sign in 
the results, this suggest an increase in social control in adjacent places due to the reception 
of displaced persons, it reduces personal injuries among the population in local areas. 
Residence burglary presents dual effects:  more forced displaced persons cause an increase 
in this type of crime in the local area, and an increase in forced migrants in nearest places 
contribute to a reduction of residence burglary. Only the automobile theft rate is unrelated to 
the reception of forced displaced persons in main and adjacent areas.  
The results of spatial effects about the reception of forced displacement persons, suggest that 
in just the cases of homicides and personal injuries present direct and significant effects, 
which means that the increase in 1% of the forced displacements persons cause an increase 
in homicides and a decline in personal injuries close to 2% for both cases, in the same 
municipality of reception. Furthermore, the indirect effect of the reception of forced 
displaced people imply the existence of significant spatial spillovers and suggests that an 
increase of 1% in neighboring municipalities have positive impact in homicide and 
kidnapping rates about 17% and 6% respectively and negative impact close to 17% in 
residence burglary and 13% in personal injuries. 
A correlation between the crime categories and the reception of forced displaced people can 
be suggested, rather than a causality link. The possible reason is related to omitted variables 
bias. Each crime category has specific dynamics and determinants, accompanied with limited 
data for the municipalities, these are difficulties that impede the identification of more 
appropriate specifications. Consequently with these arguments, Figure 3 provides evidence 
of the correlation. This graphic presents maps for each kind of crime in the years 2003, 2009 
and 2016, where the municipalities with high levels for each crime category and of reception 
of forced displaced persons (above the mean) present a close spatial allocation. 
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Figure 3.  Spatial correlation 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and 
Unidad para las Victimas 
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Source: Own elaboration with data of Policia Nacional de Colombia and Panel CEDE and 
Unidad para las Victimas 
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
This paper presents theory and empiric arguments of the relationship between the forced 
displaced persons and the crime rates in reception place.  The economic theory suggests that 
individuals with adverse socio-economics conditions are prone to commit crimes, are that 
indeed all the forced migration change the conditions of municipalities and affect the crimes 
rates, because all locations suffer a lack of opportunities and resource. As people who have 
been used to a certain life style arrive in the reception areas, they start to understand that they 
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can no longer support themselves. The threat of a new place may scare many people and 
when they do not understand what is going on, they might turn to less than legal solutions.  
This is explained because most of the displaced people that enter the cities are farmers with 
no formal education at all; and when there is no legal opportunities to succeed in the cities, 
the informal market and the local gangs appear as an option where there is much money with 
a little effort. People arrive after having lost not only their possessions but sometimes their 
dignity, and they need fast incomes and sadly, the easiest way to attain these are through 
illegal methods. Once a person is involved in this, it is hard to get out, and therefore, 
displacement creates an increase in crime. Even though some people may start small, crime 
is a vicious circle that drags people in constantly and makes them preform crimes that they 
might sometimes not want to, and as people slowly get involved for money, it becomes harder 
to get out.  
The empirical results provide evidence for some kind of crime the causality between crime 
and reception of forced displaced persons and the heterogeneity of population, and result 
suggest a correlation relationship for all crimes of the analysis, because some places have 
highest rates of crime and forced migrants, additionally these areas presents a nearest spatial 
allocation in Colombian territory. It is necessary, in the light of these expected results, that 
the government's effort is to generate opportunities for this vulnerable population, victims of 
internal conflict in their regions of origin and the few job opportunities in the regions where 
they arrive. It is then necessary to motivate in these families the qualification of their 
members according to the needs of the productive sector, and to encourage those firms of 
activities that are labor intensive, ideally qualified, in order to generate greater economic 
returns to these households. Therefore, social and economic programs to reduce the adverse 
conditions of the vulnerable population they must be executed through plans that impact the 
local population of the municipalities and nearest areas. 
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ANNEX 
 
Annex 1. Statistics test for fixed effects panel model 
 
Annex 1.1 Hausman test for homicide rate 
 
Homicide rate 
  Coefficients     
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect Difference S.E. 
       
Reception FDP rate 0.0460345 0.1257867 -0.0797522 0.0040293 
Population 2.335417 1.580372 0.755045 0.5779111 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.3009599 -0.0899501 -0.2110099 0.0268817 
Probability of apprehension 0.0092097 0.0087392 0.0004705 0.0000836 
 
Test:  Coefficient  P. Value 
(FE-RE)=0 441.37 0.000 
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Annex 1.2 Breush-Pagan test for homicide rate 
 
Breusch - Pagan Test 
Component  Variance  S. E. 
 
   
Homicide rate 27.64952 5.258281 
e 15.80386 3.975408 
u 4.561606 2.135792 
     
Test Value P. Value 
Var(u)=0 5508.7 0.000 
 
Annex 1.3 Hausman test for kidnapping rate 
 
Kidnapping rate 
  Coefficients     
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect Difference S.E. 
       
Reception FDP rate 0.0275244 0.0754745 -0.04795 0.0046888 
Population -3.979022 0.7872241 -4.766246 0.5350277 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.6105842 -0.1824084 -0.4281757 0.0273372 
Probability of apprehension 0.000308 0.0003114 -0.00000338 0.00000494 
 
Test:  Coefficient  P. Value 
(FE-RE)=0 438.52 0.000 
 
 
Annex 1.4 Breush-Pagan test for kidnapping rate 
 
Breusch - Pagan Test 
Component  Variance  S. E. 
 
   
Kidnapping rate 17.56637 4.191225 
e 13.46473 3.669431 
u 1.663708 1.289848 
     
Test Value P. Value 
Var(u)=0 1140.93 0.000 
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Annex 1.5 Hausman test for personal injuries rate 
Personal injuries rate 
  Coefficients     
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect Difference S.E. 
       
Reception FDP rate -0.0546421 -0.0575634 0.0029213 0.0040608 
Population -0.0516808 0.8854523 -0.9371331 0.5363529 
Percentage Male 19-34 0.3285432 0.0487832 0.27976 0.0258553 
Probability of apprehension 0.0013116 0.0008334 0.0004783 0.0000819 
 
Test:  Coefficient  P. Value 
(FE-RE)=0 134.76 0.000 
 
 
Annex 1.6 Breush-Pagan test for personal injuries rate 
 
Breusch - Pagan Test 
Component  Variance  S. E. 
 
   
Personal injuries rate 17.95184 4.236961 
e 13.57667 3.684654 
u 3.325764 1.823668 
     
Test Value P. Value 
Var(u)=0 3811.19 0.000 
 
 
Annex 1.7 Hausman test for residence burglary rate 
 
Residence burglary  rate 
  Coefficients     
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect Difference S.E. 
       
Reception FDP rate -0.0131383 -0.0234569 0.0103186 0.0052858 
Population 2.645542 2.055372 0.5901706 0.7264877 
Percentage Male 19-34 0.1434702 -0.0786818 0.222152 0.0339206 
Probability of apprehension 0.0063989 0.0063269 0.000072 0.0001692 
 
Test:  Coefficient  P. Value 
(FE-RE)=0 55.74 0.000 
 
 
 
35 
 
Annex 1.8 Breush-Pagan test for residence burglary rate 
 
Breusch - Pagan Test 
Component  Variance  S. E. 
 
   
Burglary 
residence rate 37.291 6.107242 
e 24.85036 4.985013 
u 7.235115 2.689817 
     
Test Value P. Value 
Var(u)=0 5026.35 0.000 
 
Annex 1.9 Hausman test for automobile theft rate 
 
Automobile theft rate 
  Coefficients     
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect Difference S.E. 
       
Reception FDP rate 0.0000459 -0.0016875 0.0017333 0.0036703 
Population 0.415875 2.064432 -1.648557 0.5786497 
Percentage Male 19-34 -0.0816756 -0.0912083 0.0095327 0.0251465 
Probability of apprehension 0.0129228 0.0138674 -0.0009446 0.0001238 
 
Test:  Coefficient  P. Value 
(FE-RE)=0 59.79 0.000 
 
Annex 1.10 Breush-Pagan test for automobile theft rate 
 
Breusch - Pagan Test 
Component  Variance  S. E. 
 
   
Automobile theft 29.71991 5.451597 
e 15.90869 3.98857 
u 7.187335 2.680921 
     
Test Value P. Value 
Var(u)=0 9967.1 0.000 
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Annex 2. Spatial models estimation 
 
Annex 2.1 SAR Models estimation  
 
 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries rate 
model 
Burglary residences 
model 
Automobile theft 
rate 
            
Reception FDP rate .03928658*** .01875999** -.0395144*** -0.00218982 -0.00134828 
Population 1.9935376*** -2.7813709*** -0.36926941 1.5847831** 0.19830885 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.26203474*** -.4400183*** .21677485*** .08100764** -0.05351436 
Probability of 
apprehension .00923633*** .00030295*** .00156969*** .00631998*** .01300001*** 
            
Spatial           
Dependent variable .16346578*** .25485003*** .34195674*** .36167261*** .21290555*** 
            
Constant 3.9444627*** 3.5906023*** 3.5436229*** 4.7608031*** 3.9336012*** 
            
Statistics           
AIC 79617.765 77038.73 76805.381 85258.433 79586.996 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Annex 2.2 SLX Models estimation 
 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries rate 
model 
Burglary residences 
model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .02898481*** 0.00514448 -.03273289*** 0.00546563 -0.00230181 
Population 1.2616546* 0.63531079 -1.7577104*** -0.80987899 -0.87998387 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.17428178*** -0.03200999 0.00437306 -.12981466** -0.01033292 
Probability of 
apprehension .00942731*** .00030885*** .00243371*** .00683815*** .0128903*** 
            
Spatial           
Reception FDP rate .13775192*** .05994831*** -.13569803*** -.11106698*** 0.00447079 
Population 3.5868556*** -7.2871409*** 1.8455236* 6.7067214*** 3.8475209*** 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.16927997** -.87423029*** .39876563*** .28681466*** -.19413384*** 
Probability of 
apprehension -.00316192*** 0.00003579 -.00365547*** -0.0026884 -.00288404* 
            
Constant 3.9630603*** 3.6229821*** 3.6626073*** 4.9706619*** 3.9849507*** 
            
Statistics           
AIC 79691.535 77134.901 77444.874 86146.919 79848.503 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Annex 2.3 SEM Models estimation 
 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries 
rate model 
Burglary residences 
model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .03521429*** .01794219** -.03324451*** 0.00454871 -0.00132783 
Population 1.8253695*** -2.8319352*** -0.52333682 1.0963063 -0.13440098 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.2763521*** -.45765801*** .21191998*** 0.05374717 -0.05342487 
Probability of 
apprehension .00943298*** .0003017*** .00196801*** .00671644*** .01311403*** 
            
Spatial           
Spatial error term  .16868963*** .24557798*** .34326594*** .36410139*** .21723251*** 
            
Constant 3.9431657*** 3.6021918*** 3.5459156*** 4.7598794*** 3.9317971*** 
            
Statistics           
AIC 79612.803 77118.258 76826.326 85257.913 79578.766 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Annex 2.4 SAC Models estimation 
 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries rate 
model 
Burglary residences 
model 
Automobile theft 
rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .02308928** 0.01177801 -.03054955*** 0.01545757 -0.00156363 
Population 1.242563* -1.6997357*** -0.34742308 -0.53589577 -0.7624258 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.25724749*** -.26302599*** .12346633*** -0.06437202 -0.03953111 
Probability of 
apprehension .00920173*** .00024835*** .00098561*** .00604309*** .01223978*** 
            
Spatial           
Dependent variable -.39214199*** .64997189*** .71479297*** -.67399603*** -.44005112*** 
Spatial error term  .48341514*** -.61890462*** -.62198616*** .75087711*** .54602716*** 
            
        
Constant 3.81192*** 3.3158759*** 3.2493182*** 4.301082*** 3.7642613*** 
        
Statistics           
AIC 79578.417 76757.331 76536.746 84903.161 79515.438 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Annex 2.5 SDM Models estimation 
 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries rate 
model 
Burglary residences 
model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .02545592*** 0.00258285 -.02559087*** 0.01111807 -0.00302186 
Population 1.0316584 0.72543565 -1.820535*** -0.89027083 -1.0325929 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.17285591*** -0.01011524 -0.00977169 -.13506638** -0.00302814 
Probability of 
apprehension .00951187*** .00030501*** .0025492*** .0068721*** .01297582*** 
            
Spatial           
Reception FDP rate .11549539*** .04446987** -.08560804*** -.0716386*** 0.00494754 
Dependent variable .15906318*** .21832512*** .32920604*** .358109*** .21532861*** 
Population 3.0328405*** -5.8567427*** 1.9191205** 4.38724*** 3.411883*** 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.11301561* -.68744302*** .27151848*** .24438905*** -.15743907** 
Probability of 
apprehension -.00425416*** -0.0000259 -.0034893*** -.00540284*** -.00536523*** 
            
Constant 3.9348871*** 3.5686791*** 3.5347548*** 4.75317*** 3.9296665*** 
            
Statistics           
AIC 79552.905 76826.714 76718.099 85213.434 79569.176 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Annex 2.6 SDEM Models estimation 
 
Variable 
Homicide rate 
model 
Kidnapping rate 
model 
Personal injuries rate 
model 
Burglary residences 
model 
Automobile 
theft rate 
        
Reception FDP rate .0298929*** 0.00587309 -.0327803*** 0.00583986 -0.00267197 
Population 1.1489348 0.32010642 -1.6456728*** -0.3129891 -0.81211668 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.18456035*** -0.06336306 0.0325431 -.09830376* -0.01023238 
Probability of 
apprehension .00942682*** .00030653*** .00231434*** .00658099*** .0128727*** 
        
Spatial           
Reception FDP rate .12341636*** .04982654** -.09620986*** -.06545627** 0.00547888 
Spatial error term  .15629713*** .21259889*** .3269925*** .35774818*** .21497482*** 
Population 3.4667442*** -6.7172771*** 1.9601676* 4.5267857*** 3.4110365*** 
Percentage Male 19-
34 -.15339968** -.79628353*** .34935521*** .29053479*** -.1771604** 
Probability of 
apprehension -.00283849*** 0.00004188 -.00313151*** -.00428018** -0.0027971 
Constant 3.9360492*** 3.5723255*** 3.5378558*** 4.7549525*** 3.9299285*** 
Statistics           
AIC 79559.112 76849.393 76739.054 85223.387 79570.68 
Observations 15344 15344 15344 15344 15344 
Significance: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
